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Abstract 
Network steganography is the art of hiding secret information within innocent network transmissions. 
Recent findings indicate that novel malware is increasingly using network steganography. Similarly, 
other malicious activities can profit from network steganography, such as data leakage or the exchange 
of pedophile data. This paper provides an introduction to network steganography and highlights its po-
tential application for harmful purposes. We discuss the issues related to countering network steganog-
raphy in practice and provide an outlook on further research directions and problems. 
 
1 Introduction 
Steganography is known to be a technology used since thousands of years; its purpose is to 
embed a secret message into an innocent looking carrier. Digital media steganography embeds 
secret data into digital structures, including digital videos, digital audio files, and digital im-
age files. Within recent years, a novel part of steganography arose, namely network steganog-
raphy. Network steganography transfers secret data over a network by hiding secret infor-
mation into legitimately appearing transmissions [LuWS10]. 
In comparison to cryptography, steganography aims at hiding the existence of a secret mes-
sage while cryptography aims on hiding the content of a message. Both technologies cryptog-
raphy and steganography are orthogonal and can be combined, i.e. a secret message can be 
encrypted and afterwards it can be hidden using steganography. 
Steganography is applied when the detection of the plain existence of a secret message can 
cause harm to the transmitters or another party. For instance, if illicit information is transmit-
ted by journalists over a part of the Internet facing censorship within a dictatorship, the appli-
cation of network steganography can protect the journalist from being caught while only en-
crypting the transmission raises attention. As network steganography is a dual-use good, it 
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can also be applied for malicious purposes, including the hidden transmission of command 
and control (C&C) information for botnets or for the hidden exchange of pedophile content. 
In this paper, we first provide a background on network steganography and afterwards high-
light recent developments in the field. We show network steganography’s potential for mali-
cious activities and discuss the application of countermeasures in the context of these novel 
approaches. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides fundamentals while 
Section 3 covers recent developments within the theme. Section 4 provides an outlook on the 
possible future of network steganography for malicious purposes and Section 5 deals with the 
question of how to counter network steganography in practice. Section 6 concludes our dis-
cussion. 
2 Fundamentals 
Before covering the state of the art in network steganography, this section provides a brief in-
troduction into the theme and highlights selected use-cases for the technology. 
2.1 Basic Concepts 
The term network steganography was coined and first introduced by Szczypiorski in 2003 
[Szczy03] and it embraces all the methods that embed secret data within innocent looking 
network transmissions. Therefore, it is necessary to define a way in which sender and receiver 
exchange the secret data, i.e. both communicators must agree on a signaling technique in ad-
vance and create a so-called covert channel over which the hidden data is transmitted. The 
term covert channel was initially introduced in operating system research by Lampson as a 
channel not intended for a communication [Lamp73]; later the term was defined as policy-
breaking communication channel by the U.S. Department of Defense [Depa85]. 
Hundreds of techniques can be applied to create a covert channel; some of the most common 
techniques are to place secret data into unused fields of network protocol headers or to change 
the size of network packets. Also it is common to manipulate inter packet gaps (IPG), i.e. the 
time between network packets, and the order of network packets. Moreover, the order of 
header elements (e.g. HTTP plaintext header lines) can be altered or artificial errors can be in-
troduced into a transmission. A comprehensive analysis and categorization of more than hun-
dred known techniques can be found in [WZFH14]. 
2.2 The Malicious Applications of Network Steganography 
The use-cases for network steganography and steganography in general are manifold but as 
indicated in recent research are mainly linked to illicit purposes [ZiMS14]. A well-known ex-
ample is the exchange of child pornography using steganography as part of Operation Twins 
in 2002 and the exfiltration of data from the U.S. Department of Justice in 2008 where sensi-
tive financial data was stolen. Other cases are the leakage of classified information from the 
U.S. to Russia by a Russian spy ring in 2010 and the application of steganography in the Du-
qu and Alureon malware [ZiMS14]. 
While most of these examples were based on traditional digital media steganography (espe-
cially digital image steganography) network steganography can be found “in the wild” as 
well. The rise of network steganography is thereby supported by two factors which make it 
superior in comparison to digital media steganography [ZiMS14]. Firstly, the space for data to 
be transferred is not limited in the same way as with a given media object (e.g. an image file) 
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as new data can be transmitted on demand while the capacity of a media object is limited. 
Secondly, network transmissions are harder to analyze in digital forensics as only parts of the 
data are stored – if the transmitted data is stored at all. 
In particular, network steganographic techniques are available since 1987 in research when 
first network covert channel techniques were presented [Girl87] and since the mid-90s in the 
hacking community that brought up tools like LOKI2 [Daem97] or Ping Tunnel [Stod09]. The 
tools provided by the hacking community embed hidden data in a simple way into the payload 
of ICMP echo messages or the payload of UDP messages – just to mention a few. The tools 
are available for free on-line, i.e. accessible for everyone. It was only a matter of time till 
malware started to apply network steganography to conceal its transmissions. For instance, a 
recent Linux malware called Linux.Fokirtor hides data within SSH transmissions [Prin13]. 
3 Recent Developments in Network Steganography 
The recent years of academic research led to even more sophisticated network steganographic 
techniques. These techniques do not only improve the stealthiness (or covertness) of the cre-
ated covert channels but also extensively enhance the capabilities of the steganographic com-
munication [WenK14]. 
3.1 Shift in the Hidden Data Carrier Selection 
The predecessors of current sophisticated network steganography methods were utilizing 
mainly different fields of TCP/IP stack protocols’ headers as a hidden data carrier and they 
focused on the embedding of secret data in the unused or reserved fields. However, recently 
we have experienced the change in the hidden data carrier selection. Now, the most favorable 
carrier is the one that is very commonly used so it is hard to spot a single steganographic 
communication along a vast volume of similar network traffic (“a needle in a hay stack”). 
Moreover, steganographers tend to exploit higher layers applications and services and the 
methods are crafted in such a way to exploit their characteristic features.  
Recent information hiding solutions utilize as hidden data carrier: (i) popular Internet services 
like Skype, BitTorrent or Google search, (ii) new networking environments e.g. cloud compu-
ting and technologies like wireless networks and (iii) novel communication devices like 
smartphones. 
 
Popular Internet Services 
Practically every popular Internet service can be exploited by steganographers if it goes with 
enough volume of traffic that can be altered to produce the covert channel. One such example 
is IP telephony service which can be considered a fairly recent discovery however until now a 
decent number of techniques were proposed [Mazu14].  
One of the steganographic methods of this kind is TranSteg (Transcoding Steganography), 
[MaSS12] which is based on the general idea of transcoding (lossy compression) of the voice 
data from a higher bit rate codec, and thus greater voice payload size, to a lower bit rate codec 
with smaller voice payload size (which should be performed with the least degradation in 
voice quality possible). In other words, compression of the covert data is utilized to free space 
for hidden data bits.  
Other methods target even more currently popular peer-to-peer (p2p) services like Skype and 
BitTorrent. For the first solution a steganographic method named SkyDe (Skype Hide) has 
been proposed by Mazurczyk et al. [MaKS2013]. As a hidden data carrier encrypted Skype 
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voice packets are used. By taking advantage of the high correlation between speech activity 
and packet size, packets without voice signal can be identified and used to carry secret data by 
replacing the encrypted silence with secret data bits. In the second case the method named 
StegTorrent has been introduced for the BitTorrent application [KoMS13]. It benefits from 
the fact that, in BitTorrent there are usually many-to-one transmissions, and that for one of its 
specific protocols – μTP – the header provides means for packets’ numbering and retrieving 
their original sequence. Thus this characteristic feature allows to mark each packet leaving the 
transmitter regardless of the connection it was sent from so the synchronization is not re-
quired. StegTorrent functions based on intentional BitTorrent data packet resorting at the re-
ceiver to achieve the desired packet sequences. 
It was also proved that information hiding is possible also by simply performing a series of 
innocent-looking Google searches. The StegSuggest steganographic method [BiMS11] targets 
the feature Google Suggest which lists the 10 most popular search phrases given a string of 
letters a user has entered in Google’s search box. The hidden data transmitter intercepts the 
traffic exchanged between Google’s servers and the hidden data receiver’s browser when 
some Google search is initiated. Then, the packets traveling from Google to the hidden data 
receiver are intercepted and modified by adding a unique word to the end of each of the 10 
phrases Google suggests. The choice of phrases is made from a list of 4096 common English 
words, so the new phrases do not look too suspicious. Then the receiver extracts each added 
word and converts it into a 10-bit sequence using a previously shared lookup table. 
New Networking Environments and Technologies  
The cloud computing environment can be also exploited to enable covert communication. Ris-
tenpart et al. [RTSS09] showed that it is possible to perform cross-virtual machine infor-
mation leakage by introducing a wide range of techniques for obtaining confidential data by 
probing the values of shared-cache load, CPU load, keystroke activity, and similar. 
Covert communication possibilities have been also recently considered for Content-Centric 
Networks (CCNs) which are envisaged to replace current IP-based Internet in the future.  
Ambrosini et al. [ACGT14] inspected the potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited for in-
formation hiding purposes. They focus on so called ephemeral covert communication where 
the communicating parties are not exchanging any packets directly instead they intentionally 
influence the content of the router’s cache and the delay in its responses to embed and extract 
hidden data bits. Hidden messages are then present in the cache only for the limited time peri-
od and later they are automatically deleted from the network without any additional, required 
actions. 
Information hiding techniques also target wireless networks, are considered a very popular 
and dynamically evolving network steganography subfield where different standards can be 
subject to covert communication. For example, for WLANs, Szczypiorski and Mazurczyk 
have introduced a method called WiPad (Wireless Padding) [SzcW11]. The technique is 
based on the insertion of hidden data into the padding of frames at the physical layer of 
WLANs. A similar concept was also utilized e.g. for LTE (Long Term Evolution) [GraS14]. 
Other promising future-network protocols, like, for example, the SCTP (Stream Control 
Transmission Protocol) which is a candidate for new transport layer protocol, and might re-
place TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) and UDP (User Datagram Protocol) protocols, 
turned out to be also prone to steganography. A detailed analysis in [FrMS12a] revealed ste-
ganographic vulnerabilities that could be utilized for information hiding with a focus on new 
features and characteristic of SCTP, such as multi-homing and multi-streaming. 
 
Hidden and Uncontrolled – On the Emergence of Network Steganography  5 
Novel Communication Devices 
The recent wave of smartphones is equipped with hardware capabilities previously only avail-
able in standard desktops or laptops. They now integrate into a unique tool functionalities his-
torically offered by different devices, for instance the camera or the Global Positioning Sys-
tem (GPS). Besides, advancements in wireless connectivity allow connecting to the Internet 
by using different standards, such as the IEEE 802.11, 3G/4G or the LTE. Therefore, 
smartphones are now used to exchange and store high volumes of personal data, interact with 
Online Social Networks (OSNs) and in the daily working practice. The latter is also account-
ing for new paradigms, for instance the Bring Your Own Device (BYOD). To handle such 
complexity, modern smartphones are equipped with an OS having a degree of sophistication 
comparable to desktop counterparts. In some cases, mobile OSs are ports of desktop-class 
versions, e.g., Android runs a Linux kernel. However, the vocation of storing sensitive data 
by-design requires proper additional layers to ensure security and confidentiality of data. 
While different techniques exist, the most popular idea is to rely on sandboxes, i.e., execution 
environments forcing a process (application) to not access sensitive data or portion of the 
hardware.  
In this perspective, steganographic possibilities are dramatically multiplied in smartphones for 
the following reasons: (i) the multimedia capability enables to create and use a wide variety of 
carriers, such as, audio, video, pictures, or Quick-Response (QR) Codes; (ii) the availability 
of a full featured TCP/IP stack, as well as the possibility of interact with desktop-class ser-
vices lead to a complete reutilization of all the network methods already available for standard 
computing devices or appliances; (iii) the richness of the adopted OS permit to develop so-
phisticated applications, thus making covert channels based on VoIP and p2p exploitable. 
However, the most active trend in research and development of steganography methods for 
smartphones consciously neglect network methods. Firstly, the security layers used in mobile 
OSs turn out to be barely adequate. Secondly, many manufacturers enforce users to install 
software only from verified sources (see, e.g., iOS which only permit software provided by 
the Apple AppStore) that deeply inspect the software before the publishing stage, thus early 
detecting malicious threats. Summarizing, the real challenge for smartphone steganography is 
not only “using network to exfiltrate data”, but “acquire the data to be exfiltrated” and “gain 
access to the network” [MazC14].  
Therefore, network steganography in smartphones is almost always jointly used with a local 
covert channel. While, the former can be implemented by directly borrowing methods from 
desktops, the latter is the actual technological enabler for data exfiltration. The paradigmatic 
use case of a local covert channel, considers two processes, P1 and P2, each one running in a 
sandbox S1 and S2, respectively. Specifically, S1 and S2 have been configured to prevent da-
ta leaking. For instance, if P1 can access the address book, S1 will impede to use network in-
terfaces. Let us assume then P1 is a malware wanting to exfiltrate the address book, while P2 
is companion application (often named a colluding application in many research works) look-
ing innocuous. This security mechanism is typically bypassed as follows: P1 leaks data to P2 
via covert channel, and P2, after receiving the data, will use network steganography to contact 
a remote facility in a stealthy manner.   
The first work implementing such a mechanism is a malware called SoundComber [SZIK11], 
which is able to capture personal user data, like the digits entered on the keypad of the device 
during a phone call. It can use up to four different methods to enable the two colluding pro-
cesses to communicate: 1) by embedding secrets in well-defined patterns of toggling the vi-
bration; 2) by hiding data within changes in the volume level of the ringtone; 3) by lock-
ing/unlocking the screen; 4) by concurrently competing in a coordinated flavor on a file lock. 
Marforio et al. [MaFC12] extended this idea by implementing seven additional local covert 
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channels. While some ideas partially overlap with previous ones, their work also exploits a 
widely used feature of the Android OS: intents. Intents are distributed notifications used to 
implement basic forms of Inter Process Communication (IPC). Thus, two colluding processes 
can communicate by exchanging patterns of notifications, e.g., the calendar has changed or 
the language has been modified. We point out that, while intents are limited to Android, some 
forms of notifications are also available in iOS, thus making the method applicable in other 
platforms. Lastly, Lalande and Wendzel [LalS13] offered a variation of the aforementioned 
mechanisms by using a mix of operations performed on the task list, the screen state, and by 
manipulating the process priorities to achieve higher undetectability.   
3.2 Control Protocols and Adaptive Techniques 
The 2004 released tool Ping Tunnel [Stod09] is not only capable of transferring hidden data 
using ICMP echo request and reply but does also place a control protocol header into its pay-
load. Such a control protocol usually implements reliability into the channel, i.e. allowing re-
sending lost packets and moreover allowing re-ordering hidden data at the receiver side. 
Control protocols for network steganography were discussed in various academic publications 
in which their feature-set was enhanced. 
A significant step in this regard was the automatic discovery of techniques that can be used 
between two or more peers to exchange secret data. Yarochkin et al. introduced a network en-
vironment learning (NEL) phase in which peers probe the hiding of data within different net-
work protocols using a set of methods and filter out blocked and non-routed network proto-
cols [YDL+08]. This also allows bypassing administrative set-ups and changes in the configu-
ration. For instance, if a network steganographic communication got detected and the admin-
istrator blocks the utilized communication it can automatically switch to another hiding meth-
od or another network protocol to establish a network steganographic communication never-
theless [YDL+08, WenK14, JaWS13]. 
The next step for network steganography was to build hidden overlay networks capable of re-
alizing a routing process. The first approach – based on the random-walk algorithm – was al-
ready presented in 2007 by Szczypiorski et al. in [SzIW07]. Later, a stealth-optimized dynam-
ic routing based on the optimized link-state routing (OLSR) using size-optimized control pro-
tocols was published [BaWK12]. 
3.3 Optimization Means 
While control protocols for network steganography increased the capabilities of hidden com-
munication, a following step was to optimize not only undetectability of the transmission of 
the user’s secret data bits but the control protocol’s stealthiness, too. This concept was initial-
ly discussed in [WenK11], where the optimal size of a control protocol header for simultane-
ously used carrier protocols was discussed [WenK11]. Moreover, two additional protocol en-
gineering approaches for control protocols are available today. 
The first approach presented in [WenK12] utilizes formal grammar to adjust the embedded 
control protocol to the utilized network protocol in which it is hidden. Therefore the specifica-
tion of the hidden control protocol must be designed in a way that it matches the specification 
of the utilized protocol in a way that no anomaly is caused by the hidden control protocol’s 
operation. 
The less secret data is transferred by a steganographic method, the less attention will be 
raised. Therefore, the second approach for control protocol engineering is to minimize the size 
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of the control protocol to as few bits as possible, what can also be achieved by separating the 
components of the protocol [BaWK12]. 
For optimizing the communication process between peers, approaches exist to minimize the 
caused overhead of a covert communication as well as to minimize the packet count for a giv-
en amount of bytes to be transmitted over simultaneously used carriers [WenK11]. 
An additional view on the improvement of the undetectability for covert communication was 
presented by Frączek et al. [FrMS11]. Besides classifying the techniques to improve the 
stealthiness of a hidden communication, the authors introduced  multi-level steganography 
(MLS) in which at least two steganographic methods are utilized simultaneously in such a 
way that one method’s network traffic serves as a carrier for the second method (previous ap-
proaches did only combine unnested parallel connections [WenK11]) Such a relationship has 
been proven to have several potential benefits: (i) the lower-level method can carry a crypto-
graphic key that deciphers the steganogram carried by the upper-level method; (ii) it can be 
used to provide the steganogram with integrity, and (iii) it may be assigned as a signaling 
channel of the control protocol [FrMS12b]. 
The most recent idea is to take the distortion of the carrier that is used for transferring hidden 
data into account. The so-called network steganographic cost measures this distortion and can 
be compared to measures such as the Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR) or Mean Opinion 
Score (MOS) known from digital media steganography [MWIS14]. By optimizing the cost of 
a network steganographic transmission, the stealthiness of the communication can also be in-
creased. 
4 Outlook 
While the previous section covered novel approaches for network steganography, including 
its sub-domain network covert channels, we will now provide an outlook on the possible fu-
ture applications of network steganography for malicious purposes. 
Firstly, we expect that the application of the mentioned techniques leads to more sophisticat-
ed malware. This means that malware will be stealthier and thus harder to detect than today 
forming a new type of Advanced Persistent Threat (APT). Deploying dynamic overlay rout-
ing and adaptive network covert channel techniques, malware will moreover be harder to pre-
vent on the network level. A host-based detection of malware is thus important when a net-
work-level detection and prevention is not feasible in these situations. Today’s command and 
control (C&C) channels in botnets already possess a comprehensive feature set and adapting 
these features to the context of network steganography is only one step in the malware evolu-
tion. 
Secondly, we observe the increasing stealthiness of malware communications on smart 
phones. While there is not a major effort in developing novel network covert channels espe-
cially crafted for smartphones, recent trends take advantage on the device offloading features, 
especially those using the cloud. In fact, to bypass some storage or battery limitation of devic-
es, some operations are delegated to a remote server farm. In this perspective, new applica-
tions producing traffic potentially exploitable for network steganography are becoming avail-
able. We mention among the others, voice-based services like Google Now and Siri or cloud 
storage platforms like Google Drive and Dropbox. Even if many frameworks use proto-
cols/techniques already used for network steganography (e.g., HTTP), the huge volumes and 
the degree of sophistication of many services will represent a great challenge, especially in 
terms of being able to detect the covert communication or to provide effective countermeas-
ures.  
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Thirdly, we predict the emergence of network steganography to new domains, especially 
when combined with existing malware. One example in this regard is the potential to form 
novel botnets consisting of smart buildings instead of computers (so called smart building 
botnets), allowing the remote mass-surveillance and remote control of smart cities 
[WZMS14]. Network steganography can increase the stealthiness of mass surveillance in such 
situations, especially when the number of bots in a smart building botnet is high. 
Fourth, network steganography could increase the stealthiness of illegal data exchange, in-
cluding communications we find within darknets already today, such as the exchange of child 
pornographic material or hitman hiring. 
Fifth, it can be expected that network steganography can highly influence to industrial espi-
onage when it comes to data leakage. While today’s data leakage is performed quite plainly 
in many cases – e.g., data is leaked via email or USB stick – recent news have shown that im-
age steganography is indeed applied to leak data out of organizational environments. Using 
network steganography, data leakage cannot only be realized in a stealthy but also in a con-
stant manner, e.g. by intentionally leaking a small amount of data per hour.  
5 How to Counter Network Steganography? 
A significant problem when it comes to countermeasures is the variety of existing ste-
ganographic techniques. Not only can network steganography be applied to various network 
protocols and various types of digitally transmitted media (e.g. audio steams, video streams, 
or HTML content) but also by using an increasing number of hiding techniques. At the mo-
ment at least a few hundred hiding techniques including their combinations are known and 
even if digital payload is not taken into account, more than hundred techniques remain that 
transfer secret data using meta information, such as header elements or the timing of network 
packets [WZFH14]. 
Countermeasures, on the other hand, cannot address all of these available hiding techniques 
simultaneously due to the complexity and diversity of protocols and services and do only af-
fect one or a few hiding techniques each. If, on the other hand, countermeasures aim on af-
fecting many hiding methods simultaneously, it is an unsolved challenge to provide a high ac-
curacy. The most efficient techniques applied today are the integration of traffic normalizers 
to prevent network steganography and the use of machine learning to detect it. Some of these 
techniques are integrated into data leakage protection (DLP) products available on the market. 
When it comes to the application of advanced techniques as discussed in the previous section, 
the detection, the limitation, and the prevention, of network steganography will become even 
more challenging. Before countermeasures for such advanced scenarios can be built, research 
must come up with fundamental approaches to counter these techniques. Afterwards, products 
must be developed to enable a protection within organizational network environments. A re-
cently discussed approach that is still in its infancies is to deduce so-called patterns (abstract 
descriptions) from hiding techniques and develop countermeasures for these techniques based 
on patterns [WZFH14]. This way, one countermeasure can influence majority of the tech-
niques which are represented by a particular pattern. 
6 Conclusion 
The general conclusion of this work is that the network steganography methods will continue 
to become more and more sophisticated and harder to detect. Moreover, new and popular hid-
den data carriers could be exploited. Thus the network steganography threat can potentially 
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affect every Internet user as it must be emphasized that also innocent users’ traffic can be uti-
lized by steganographers for covert communication. This will raise similar legal and ethical 
issues like we currently experience with botnets. 
We have observed the significant increase in the application of network steganography for 
malicious purposes recently. Given the spectrum of available techniques that increase the 
quality, capabilities and stealthiness of network steganography and their dynamic evolution, it 
can be considered likely that further malware and malicious activities will apply network ste-
ganography “means” in an increasing manner. 
A problematic aspect in this regard is the lack of effective and universal countermeasures 
which can be applied in practice when it comes to such sophisticated steganographic tech-
niques. We therefore deduce a need for additional research in the field of network steganogra-
phy that will lead to improved countermeasures. 
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